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The State of Electoral Reforms in Ghana 
Ransford Edward Van Gyampo 
Abstract: Following Ghana’s December 2012 elections, there was a pro-
tracted election petition process at the nation’s Supreme Court challenging 
the declaration of the winner as the duly elected presidential candidate. 
Even though the Supreme Court ruled in favour of the declared winner, it 
made several recommendations that paved the way for numerous inter-
ventions aimed at putting together proposals for electoral reform to fine-
tune Ghana’s electoral processes. Several such reform proposals were 
submitted to the Electoral Commission by the end of 2013. Nevertheless, 
these were not implemented to guide the 2016 general elections. The suc-
cessful conduct of the 2016 elections has therefore been described as a 
“miracle.” Why were the reform proposals not implemented? What is the 
current state of reform proposals submitted to the Electoral Commission? 
What is the way forward? This article addresses these questions. 
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Ghana’s electoral processes have undergone several reforms since 1992, 
as a result of elite consensus and a series of submitted and implemented 
reform proposals. These reforms have been carried out with a view to 
fine-tuning the electoral processes and ensuring that issues of previous 
elections are addressed for better election management in the future. In 
2013, several reform proposals were submitted to the Electoral Commis-
sion (EC) after an eight-month election petition process at the Supreme 
Court. Unfortunately, the EC was unable to implement a preponderant 
number of these proposed reforms.  
Based on interviews with key political party officials, particularly 
those from the two main political parties in Ghana – the National Demo-
cratic Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP) – officials 
from the Electoral Commission, and civil society representatives, as well 
as an extensive review of the state of current thinking about elections in 
Ghana, this article reviews the state of electoral reform in Ghana fol-
lowing the 2016 general elections.  
Structurally, the article operationalises the concept of electoral re-
form and undertakes a historical overview of efforts aimed at fine-tuning 
Ghana’s electoral processes since 1992. It reviews the state of reform 
proposals submitted to the Electoral Commission for implementation 
after the 2013 election petition process at the Supreme Court. It singles 
out the proposals that have been implemented and those that are yet to 
be implemented and makes recommendations to avoid the perennial 
practice in Ghana of rushing through reform implementation in a man-
ner that creates tension and suspicion and undermines thoroughness and 
effectiveness.  
Explaining Electoral Reform 
There are two main schools of thought, with contrasting views, on what 
constitutes electoral reform. The first school of thought comprises those 
who believe that electoral reform must encapsulate a wholesale replace-
ment of electoral processes (Lijphart 1994; Katz 2007). This suggests a 
detailed review of an electoral process, including the formula for allo-
cating seats and other voting arrangements. The second school of 
thought is made up of those who believe that electoral reform comprises 
all minor and major changes that serve to improve the electoral pro-
cesses. This position is captured by the studies of Jacobs and Leyenaar 
(2011), and International IDEA (2006, Chapter 12). They have argued 
that electoral reform may not necessarily entail a total overhaul of na-
tional electoral processes. Any change in electoral rules that leads to 
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alterations in the operation of the electoral system, improves it, and 
makes it responsive to the expectations of the electorate connotes elect-
oral reform (International IDEA 2006, Chapter 12). It is reform when 
the change is intended to foster and enhance the impartiality, inclusive-
ness, transparency, integrity, or accuracy of the electoral process (Jacobs 
and Leyenaar 2011). 
Since 1993, electoral reforms in Ghana have not taken the form of 
wholesale replacement of the processes along the lines of the first school 
of thought. On the contrary, reform proposals have been implemented 
with a view to improving the system and ensuring that the electoral pro-
cesses deliver results acceptable to the citizenry.  
History of Electoral Reforms in Ghana 
There were several reforms of Ghana’s electoral processes between 1992 
and 2012. In 1992, the parties that lost the November 1992 presidential 
election and boycotted the subsequent parliamentary polls in December 
of the same year threatened to refrain from participating in all future 
elections unless there was satisfactory electoral reform. The politically 
charged environment at that time threatened Ghana’s drive towards 
democratisation, as periodic elections are crucial in any journey towards 
democratic maturity. The opposition parties claimed that the electoral 
system and the processes used for the 1992 election gave untrammelled 
advantage to the NDC. Led by the NPP, the opposition parties launched 
the “Stolen Verdict” campaign, presenting a compendium of electoral 
fraud purported to have been committed against opposition parties by 
agents of the NDC and the Interim National Electoral Commission 
(INEC) during the election (NPP 1993; Boahen 1995; Gyimah-Boadi 
2004; Oquaye 2013). 
The NPP described a litany of instances of election violence perpe-
trated against its candidates and officials. All the opposition forces then 
laid out stringent conditions that had to be met before they would return 
to the electoral front. They insisted that the electoral process should be 
overhauled via (i) the creation of a transitional body to supervise the 
electoral process, (ii) the compilation of a completely new voters’ roll 
and identity cards for voters, and (iii) the replacement of the INEC with 
a new body made up of representatives from all the parties (Ayee 1998). 
On the other hand, the NDC saw the prevailing electoral process as 
efficient and therefore made no electoral change demands. According to 
the NDC, the electoral processes had not posed any threat to the cred-
ibility of the 1992 elections because the international community led by 
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the Commonwealth Secretariat’s team of election observers endorsed the 
election outcome as free and fair (Ayee 1998).  
As part of the reform process, the following steps have been taken:  
 In 1993 the parliament passed Act 451, which established the Elect-
oral Commission (EC), and through the EC the various reforms were 
initiated.1  
 In March 1994, the Inter-Party Advisory Committee (IPAC) was in-
augurated as a platform for stakeholders to discuss and resolve thorny 
areas of the electoral processes (Badu and Larvie 1996).  
 The voters’ register used in the 1992 elections was reformed be-
cause it contained inaccurate data (Ayee 1998).  
 Presidential and parliamentary elections are now held simultaneously 
to prevent an unfair advantage for the winning presidential candi-
date’s party.  
 A proposal to use both thumbprints and photo identification cards, 
rather than only thumbprints, as proof of voter identity in the new 
register and for future elections has been implemented.  
 Registration officials are now trained in order to protect and promote 
the integrity of the voters’ register. 
 Registration Review Committees have been created in all constitu-
encies in order to resolve all conflicts with respect to voter registration. 
 The translucent/opaque ballot boxes used for the 1992 elections have 
been replaced with transparent boxes.  
 Cardboard screens are now set up in the open for voters to make 
their decisions before depositing their thumb-printed ballot papers in 
the ballot box, which is located in a conspicuous place to promote 
transparency (Debrah 2011). 
 The counting of votes and declaration of results takes place immedi-
ately after voting in the presence of party agents and voters (Electoral 
Commission 1996).  
 Biometric registration and verification of voters has been introduced 
to halt fraud and other abuses in the electoral process and thereby 
enhance the credibility of the elections and their outcome. The slogan 
“no verification, no vote” has been used heavily in the media and the 
political parties’ campaign platforms to signal the end of election 
fraud.  
1  I am grateful to the anonymous reviewer for this contribution. 
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 Assets and expenditures of political parties must now be declared 
within 90 days after receipt of the final Certificate of Registration and 
21 days before general elections in order to discourage political cor-
ruption (Debrah 2011). 
 The Presidential Transition Act, 2012 was prepared and implemented 
to regulate the transfer of power from one democratically elected re-
gime to another in a manner devoid of rancour, acrimony, and ten-
sion. The draft bill was prepared and finalised by the Institute of Eco-
nomic Affairs Ghana Political Parties Programme (IEA-GPPP).2  
Generally, electoral reform proposals have been thoroughly discussed and 
accepted by the IPAC and political elites. The implementation of such 
proposals has improved the electoral processes in Ghana and contributed 
to the resilience of the nation’s electoral politics and democratic march 
forward. 
The Post-2012 Electoral Reform in Ghana 
Notwithstanding the strides made in reforming Ghana’s electoral pro-
cess, the results of the nation’s 2012 presidential elections were chal-
lenged at the Supreme Court by the then-opposition NPP. Following an 
eight-month election petition process, the Supreme Court dismissed the 
petition by the NPP and upheld John Mahama of the NDC as the validly 
elected president. The ruling also exposed some flaws in the electoral 
process that could not be glossed over in the quest for free and fair elec-
tions. In his ruling, Justice William Atuguba, the president of the panel 
of judges, noted,  
This petition, however, has exposed the need for certain electoral 
reforms. I mention some of them. The voters’ register must be 
compiled and made available to the parties as early as possible; a 
supplementary register may cater for late exigencies; the calibre of 
presiding officers must be greatly raised up; the pink sheet is too 
elaborate, a much simpler one [is necessary] to meet the pressures 
of the public, weariness and lateness of the day at the close of a poll 
etc.; the carbon copying system has to be improved upon; the Bio-
metric Device System must be streamlined to avoid breakdowns 
and the stress on the electorate involved in an adjournment of the 
2  The IEA-GPPP brings together the leaders of political parties with representa-
tion in parliament to discuss issues of national importance in an apolitical man-
ner with a view to proposing recommendations for reform. The programme is 
sponsored by the IEA and members meet once a month at the IEA Secretariat. 
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poll; and invalidating wholesale votes for insignificant excess num-
bers is not the best application of the administrative principle of the 
proportionality test.3  
Following this, the EC invited proposals for electoral reforms from 38 key 
stakeholders including political parties, faith-based organisations, profes-
sional bodies, and civil society organisations.4 The IEA, for example, un-
der the aegis of the GPPP, held a series of workshops to review the elec-
toral processes. This culminated in the submission of 25 proposals for 
electoral reform to the EC on 20 November 2013.5 Subsequently, in Janu-
ary 2015, the EC inaugurated the 10-member Electoral Reforms Commit-
tee (ERC) to examine the proposals for electoral reform and advise the 
commission on the implementation of the proposals.6 The committee – 
which comprised representatives of political parties, of the EC, and of civil 
society organisations – submitted its report containing 41 proposals for 
electoral reform to the commission in April 2015.7 
In its report in response to the electoral reform proposals submitted 
by the ERC, the EC accepted most of the proposals, albeit some with 
modifications, while others were slated for further discussion with politi-
cal parties before their acceptance and possible implementation, as dis-
cussed below.  
Proposals outside the Ambit of the Commission 
Eight proposals fell outside the ambit of the EC. It therefore forwarded 
these to the appropriate institutions, which included parliament, the 
judicial service, the attorney-general’s department, and other institutions, 
for the necessary action to be taken. These proposals concerned the term 
of office of the chairperson and members of the commission; the ap-
pointment of commission members following broad consultations and 
with prior approval of parliament; the sending of the commission’s fi-
3  Details of the judgement given by Justice Atugubah can be found in “Read 
Justice Atuguba’s judgement on the Election Petition,” 4 September 2013, in: 
233times.com, <http://233times.com/2013/09/read-justice-atugubas-judgement 
-on-the-election-petition/>. 
4 The Author was one of the representatives of the civil society groups that submit-
ted proposals for electoral reform to the Electoral Commission. 
5 The author is the coordinator of the GPPP and encouraged the leaders of the 
various political parties to submit their proposals for electoral reform. 
6 The author is a member of the Electoral Reform Committee. 
7 See report of the Electoral Reform Committee submitted to the Electoral Com-
mission in April 2015. 
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nancial estimates directly to parliament; the removal of the requirement 
for the attorney-general’s consent before prosecuting electoral offences; 
the empowerment of the commission to prosecute election offences; the 
establishment of election tribunals to rule on electoral cases and peti-
tions; the spelling out of the grounds for invalidating the election of a 
president; and the need to reduce the waiting times for decisions re-
garding a presidential election petition (EC 2015). 
Proposals Accepted with Modifications 
The commission accepted a total of 17 proposals with some modifications. 
These were as follows: 
 The need for well-trained election officials to staff the polls 
 Ongoing voter registration during the inter-election period 
 The establishment of a National Collation Centre to replace the strong-
room 
 The institutionalisation of the Inter-Party Advisory Committee meet-
ings 
 The use of biometric verification devices for voter registration and 
exhibition exercises 
 The raising of the minimum educational qualification requirements for 
various levels of election officials 
 The definition of the term “ordinarily resident” in the Constitutional 
Instrument 72 and “hails from” in relation to the requirements for 
being registered as a voter in an electoral area 
 The taking of an oath by election officials before a judicial officer 
 The holding of elections in November instead of December 
 The deferment of the adoption of electronic voting 
 The EC’s implementation of steps to reduce rejected ballots 
 The sanctioning of election officials who breach electoral laws 
 Serial numbering of all the Statement of Poll and the Declaration of 
Result sheets 
 Clarification of provisions regarding processes and procedures to be 
followed upon an adjournment of the poll 
 An improved compensation package for election officials 
 The granting of priority to vulnerable persons at all polling stations 
 Improved training of election officials and commission staff 
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A further 15 proposals were accepted in principle but required further dis-
cussion with the IPAC (EC 2015). The only proposal that was rejected by 
the Electoral Commission was the “no verification, no vote principle” 
(EC 2015). In the opinion of the EC, it would be unfair for machines to 
determine who is eligible to vote. The commission indeed recognised 
that the right of a citizen to vote is fundamental and guaranteed by the 
1992 constitution. In its view, it has an inherent mandate to ensure that 
every eligible voter gets the opportunity to vote. The commission argued 
that in the absence of the biometric verification device, or when it mal-
functions, there should be other physical or manual means of verifying 
voters in order not to disenfranchise Ghanaians.8  
The Reform Proposals and the
2016 General Elections 
The successful implementation of electoral reform proposals signals that 
the EC is preparing for future elections. It improves the credibility of the 
election management body and deals with legitimacy deficits arising out 
of the challenges and deficiencies of the electoral processes. The ques-
tion, however, is whether the commission prepared for the 2016 elec-
tions. There were several issues that created doubts in the minds of many 
Ghanaians regarding the commission’s preparedness for the task ahead.9 
For instance, in the wake of several calls for electoral reform, the com-
mission was caught in a quagmire of justifying the need to design a new 
logo. Many Ghanaians questioned the wisdom of the commission’s 
8 See the minutes of the IPAC meeting from 20 July 2015. 
9 There were unresolved issues with the voters’ register that led to the fear that 
many people who used the national health insurance identity card to register 
were not being given ample time to re-register in accordance with the Supreme 
Court ruling. Again, there was no clarity regarding how the register was going 
to be pruned to rid it of the names that were not supposed to be on it. Fur-
thermore, there was a new commission chairperson, who was perceived as in-
experienced. Also, the application of the electoral rules by the commission was 
perceived to have favoured the ruling party. Even though the main opposition 
party was cleared to contest the election, there were perceptions of executive 
and partisan manipulation on the part of the commission. Other parties that 
felt unfairly treated by the EC went to court. Indeed, there were several court 
cases whose outcomes favoured the smaller parties and provided an indication 
that the EC was perhaps not ready for the upcoming elections. See, for instance, 
“Full ruling on EC disqualification of presidential nominees,” in: Graphic Online, 8 
November 2016, <www.graphic.com.gh/news/general-news/full-ruling-on-ec-
disqualification-of-presidential-nominees.html>. 
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move to replace the national coat of arms as its symbol of authority with 
a new logo. This, to many, was a misplaced priority as no logo better sig-
nifies the independence and sovereignty of the commission than this 
symbol (Ayee 2017).  
Instead of focusing on the upcoming elections, the commission 
launched a broader Strategic Plan (2016–2020) to become the benchmark 
in Africa for conducting “independent, trusted, world-class democratic 
elections for citizens and candidates alike.” One of the key proposals 
under the plan was to strengthen the EC’s relations with key stakehold-
ers and improve the flow of communications between them. In this 
regard, the EC was able to bring together several players and actors with 
differing interests and perspectives (EC; IPAC; candidates; media; voters; 
judiciary; security agencies; security task forces at the national, regional, 
and district levels; election observers; civil society organisations; devel-
opment partners) to discuss issues relating to elections in Ghana and the 
role of the stakeholders. However, the launch of the plan could plausibly 
be described as a waste of time as it dealt with overarching issues rather 
than focusing on the pressing demand for vigorous electoral reform and 
the implementation of the specific proposals from the Electoral Reform 
Committee (Gyampo, Graham, and Yobo 2017). 
Apart from the implementation of the proposals to continue voter 
registration, use biometric verification devices for voter registration and 
exhibition, extend the period of notice for voter registration, and reduce 
the number of voters per polling station – as well as the move to shift 
elections from December to November, which was rejected by parlia-
ment – little or no information was provided regarding the implementa-
tion of the other electoral reform proposals for the 2016 election. The 
successful conduct of the 2016 general elections can therefore not be 
attributed to the implementation of serious electoral reform proposals 
(Ayee 2017). Indeed, it is imperative to stress the point that only a few 
reform proposals were implemented prior to the 2016 general elections. 
Therefore, the 2016 elections can only be described as “miraculously suc-
cessful,” as no concrete and detailed proposals for electoral reform were 
implemented (Gyampo, Graham, and Yobo 2017: 16). Even though 
Ghana’s 2016 general elections were seen as free, fair, transparent, and 
credible, the electoral processes were virtually on “auto-piloting” (ibid: 18). 
It must, however, be conceded that the stakes were also very high in the 
2016 elections. This culminated in heightened vigilance on the part of 
political parties, particularly the opposition, and contributed to the success-
ful carrying out of the elections even without the implementation of many 
reforms (Cheeseman, Lynch, and Willis 2017). 
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In an interview, Christian Owusu Parry, former director of public 
relations at the Electoral Commission and secretary to the Electoral Re-
forms Commission, noted that the commission deferred implementation 
of most of the proposals for electoral reform to 2017 because they re-
quired constitutional amendments.10 Those that required administrative 
changes were also not fully implemented because of the long-standing 
legal battles between the commission and some political parties in the 
lead-up to the 2016 elections.11 The EC thus faced a number of con-
straints which affected its ability to implement the reforms. 
The Reform Proposals and the
Aftermath of the 2016 Elections 
The state of electoral reform in Ghana appears to be in limbo, as the key 
officials of the commission continue to battle other serious diversionary 
issues with respect to their integrity and continued stay in office as election 
management officials. Indeed, following the 2016 elections, there have 
been petitions and counter-petitions to remove all three executive officers 
of the commission from office over allegations of corruption, malfeasance, 
in-fighting among the key officials, and abuse of office.12 In an interview, 
the commission’s director of communication, Eric Dzakpasu, noted that 
the allegations of corruption levelled by the top commission officials 
against one another have resulted in deep-seated hatred and internal wran-
gling. The charges include the embezzlement of funds belonging to the 
commission, the looting of the workers’ provident fund, and the awarding 
of contracts without an appropriate tendering process. Unfortunately, the 
four other non-executive members of the commission have also taken 
sides in the rumpus in a manner that has made it difficult to schedule 
commission meetings to discuss the state of electoral reform and the way 
10 Interview by the author with Christian Owusu Parry, 28 August 2017, Accra. 
11 See, for instance, “Lawsuits won’t affect election calendar – CJ,” in: citifmonline.com, 
24 October 2016, <http://citifmonline.com/2016/10/24/numerous-lawsuits-
wont-affect-election-calendar-cj/>. 
12 See more details in “EC staff petition Prez to remove Charlotte Osei,” in: 
Graphic Online, 19 July 2017, <www.graphic.com.gh/news/general-news/ec-sta 
ff-petition-prez-to-remove-charlotte-osei.html>; “Akufo-Addo refers petitions 
against 2 EC Chairpersons to CJ,” in: Joy Online, 28 July 2017, <www.myjoy 
online.com/politics/2017/July-28th/akufo-addo-refers-petitions-against-2-ec-
chairpersons-to-cj.php>; “Nana Addo refers petition against EC Deputy Chairs 
to CJ,” in: citifmonline, 28 July 2017, <http://citifmonline.com/2017/07/28/ 
nana-addo-refers-petition-against-ec-deputy-chairs-to-cj/>. 
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forward.13 Consequently, matters of electoral reform cannot be said to be 
on the front burner of the EC’s agenda as all are awaiting the outcome of 
the various investigations into alleged corruption, malfeasance, and abuse 
of office by the three.14 
The Unprecedented Dilemma
In the lead-up to the 2016 elections, some top functionaries of the now-
governing NPP criticised the appointment of the EC chairperson. They 
described her as unqualified and threatened to get rid of her when the 
party was elected to power.15 Others called her names and accused her of 
being corrupt with the tacit support of the NDC, the then-ruling party.16 
It can therefore be plausibly argued that the infighting within the EC is 
the result of the current government’s desire to have its preferred person 
made the chair of the EC. 
Ghana’s 1992 constitution allows for the removal of EC officials if 
any of the charges regarding financial impropriety levelled against them 
are found to be true. Upon receipt of a petition for removal, the presi-
dent is required to forward the petition to the chief justice, who upon 
establishing a prima facie case may initiate an investigation into the alle-
gations and make recommendations to the president.17 However, a poor 
precedent would be set if the chairperson of the EC were removed, as it 
would suggest a grand scheme by the now-ruling party to carry out its 
threat when it was in opposition. This would of course be met with stiff 
opposition from the NDC and other parties, in a manner that would 
likely create tension and disturbances in advance of the 2020 elections. 
Already, the opposition NDC has made it clear that it would resist any 
13 Interview by the author with Eric Dzakpasu, 31 August 2017, Accra. 
14 Ibid. 
15 “Charlotte Osei traded sex for her EC position – Ken Agyapong,” in: pulse.com.gh, 
27 June 2016, <www.pulse.com.gh/politics/election-2016-charlotte-osei-traded-
sex-for-her-ec-position-ken-agyapong-id5198244.html>. 
16  “Don’t condemn Ken Agyapong yet over ‘sex for job claims’ – Otiko Djaba,” in: 
citifmonline, 19 July 2016, <http://citifmonline.com/2016/07/19/dont-condemn-
ken-agyapong-yet-over-sex-for-job-claims-otiko-djaba/>; “EC boss insult: We’ll 
not condemn Kennedy Agyapong – NPP,” in: YEN.com.gh, n.d., <https://yen. 
com.gh/59642-we-will-not-condemn-kennedy-agyapong-npp.html>. 
17  The appointment and conditions of service of the EC officials are analogous to 
those of superior court judges in Ghana. Article 146 of the 1992 constitution 
spells out the details.  
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attempt at removing the EC chair.18 On the other hand, there will be no 
justification for keeping the heads of the EC in office if they are found 
culpable of even one of the allegations levelled against them. Virtually all 
the allegations,19 if proven to be true, would constitute adequate grounds 
for removal.20 Given the extent of damage to the relationship among the 
EC officials, it may be difficult for them to work together to discuss 
matters relating to electoral reform even if they are not removed from 
office. The quest for prompt implementation of electoral reform pro-
posals will still suffer severe setbacks if the entire commission is over-
hauled and the three officials are made to step aside, since the institu-
tional memory regarding already-initiated work on electoral reform may 
then be compromised.  
The Way Forward 
Moves towards electoral reform have certainly hit a snag in view of the 
current challenges within the EC itself. While the investigative processes 
are ongoing, the work of the EC must not stop. Institutions must not 
grind to a halt in the absence of leadership. In this regard, the directors 
of the commission and other key staff must pick up and sustain the pro-
cess of implementing the reform proposals. Those reforms that require 
amendments of laws must be tabled before the appropriate quarters 
now, while the outcome of the investigations is being awaited. Reforms 
18 See „NDC fights for EC Boss; dumps Sulley, Georgina,” in: citifmonline.com, 14 
December 2017, <http://citifmonline.com/2017/12/14/ndc-fights-ec-boss-dum 
ps-sulley-georgina/>; “We’ll fiercely resist removal of EC boss – NDC MP,” in: 
Peacefmonline.com, 23 July 2017, <www.peacefmonline.com/pages/politics/politics 
/201707/321522.php>.  
19 For details of all the allegations levelled against them, see “EC boss responds to 
27 allegations against her,” in: Classfmonline.com, n.d., <http://m.classfmonline. 
com/1.11158603>; “Charlotte Osei ‘wages war’ on three deputies in fresh allega-
tions,” in: Joy Online, 22 July 2017, <www.myjoyonline.com/politics/2017/July-
22nd/charlotte-osei-wages-war-on-three-deputies-in-fresh-allegations.php>. 
20 Article 44 (2)(3) of the 1992 constitution states that the chairperson of the EC 
shall have the same terms and conditions of service as a justice of the Court of 
Appeal. Accordingly, the chairperson of the EC cannot be removed from office 
except in the event of “stated misbehaviour or incompetence or on grounds of 
inability to perform the functions of his/her office arising from infirmity of body 
or mind.” Article 151 (1) also states, “A person holding a judicial office may be 
removed from office by the Chief Justice on the grounds only of stated misbe-
haviour, incompetence or inability to perform his/her functions arising from in-
firmity of body or mind and upon a resolution supported by the votes of not less 
than two-thirds of all members of the Judicial Council.” 
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that require changes in administrative practices or require concrete ac-
tions must be tabled, discussed among the directors, and implemented. 
Reform that falls outside the jurisdiction of the commission must not 
only be forwarded to the appropriate institutions, but must be followed 
up by the commission to ensure that the proposals are not gathering 
dust. The commission must not rest on its oars after forwarding the 
recommendations. The success of electoral reform, even though it may 
be a shared responsibility, must be the concern of the commission more 
than any other stakeholder. In this regard, the EC must work with the 
other institutions to ensure that all proposals are implemented.  
Additionally, the commission, with or without its chairs, must 
communicate what is being done to fine-tune the electoral processes and 
must ensure that all relevant proposals being implemented are brought 
to the attention not only of the political parties, but also of other key 
stakeholders, including the general public. This would help boost public 
confidence in the commission, promote the integrity of the electoral 
process, and generate broader acceptance of future election results. 
Again, the EC must sensitise the citizenry about the electoral processes, 
the related challenges, and how these challenges are being addressed in a 
more practical and expeditious manner to overcome the perception that 
time is being wasted.  
Last but not least, the commission must ensure transparency in its 
dealings with stakeholders, engaging frequently with them in candid 
dialogue without necessarily pandering to their whimsical demands. It is 
time for more dialogue between the EC and its stakeholders in order to 
court support, advice, and assistance from all in rebuilding the commis-
sion’s legitimacy, image, and goodwill. Establishing a new image for the 
EC will certainly be helpful in ensuring stakeholder cooperation in the 
successful implementation of electoral reform proposals.  
Ghana has been praised by many observers for its third successful 
change of government by election in 2016, but on this occasion such 
success cannot be credited to the country’s most prominent electoral 
institutions. If democracy is to be consolidated, institutions have to be 
functional and functioning. There is currently room for improvement in 
both respects. 
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Zum Stand der Wahlreform in Ghana 
Zusammenfassung: Nach den Wahlen in Ghana vom Dezember 2012 
kam es zu einem langwierigen Petitionsverfahren vor dem Höchsten Ge-
richt des Landes, weil der Wahlsieg des zum Gewinner erklärten Präsident-
schaftskandidaten angezweifelt wurde. Zwar fiel das Urteil des Gerichts 
letztendlich zugunsten des erklärten Wahlsiegers aus, doch es enthielt auch 
einige Empfehlungen für künftige Wahlen. Diese Empfehlungen bereite-
ten den Weg für eine gezielte Sammlung von Vorschlägen zur Wahlreform 
in Ghana, um künftige Wahlverfahren zu verbessern. Bis Ende 2013 wa-
ren der  Wahlkommission etliche Reformvorschläge zugegangen. Bei der 
Vorbereitung der Wahlen von 2016 wurden diese Vorschläge allerdings 
nicht berücksichtigt. Daher ist die erfolgreiche Durchführung dieser Wah-
len als „Wunder“ bezeichnet worden. Doch warum waren die Reformvor-
schläge nicht umgesetzt worden? Wie steht es derzeit um die Vorschläge, 
die der Wahlkommission zugeleitet wurden? Wie geht es weiter? Diesen 
Fragen geht der Autor nach. 
Schlagwörter: Ghana, Wahl/Abstimmung, Nationale Wahlen, Politische 
Reformen, Politische Entwicklung 
